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Abstract— The aim of risk management of socio-cyber-physical 
systems at designing is the integral safety, which ensures their 
coexistence with their vicinity  throughout their life cycles. On 
the basis of present knowledge and experience, part of risks that 
threaten socio-cyber-physical systems shall be mitigated by 
preentive measures during their designing and manufacturing. 
Due to dynamic changes of the world, the conditions of socio-
cyber-physical systems at operation change. If  changes exceed 
the socio-cyber-physical systems´ safety limits which were insert-
ed into their designs, the accidents or  socio-cyber-physical 
sysems´ failures occur. The presented risk management plan is 
tool which ensures the prevention of such unaccepted situations 
and the safety.     
Keywords- socio-cyber-physical system, design, failure, risk 
sources, safety, coexistence, risk management plan. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The human lives in modern society are made easier 
through socio-cyber-physical systems that are the result of the 
skill of human generations. However, all these positive conse-
quences of technical progress on the human system function-
ing are redeemed by existence of a much larger number of 
risks that lead to: the failure of the State basic functions; safety 
level reduction; and disruption of coexistence of socio-cyber-
physical systems (further “SCPSs”) with their surroundings. 
Coexistence generally means a common existence. The need 
for and the importance of coexistence is now under considera-
tion in many technical fields [1-11]; the problem is discussed 
in detail e.g. in work [12].  
The SCPSs consist of a series of parts that are intercon-
nected and have object or network structures. Particular atten-
tion is currently being given to large-scale SCPSs that provide 
quality basic services to humans. They are complex  and many 
of them ensure the fulfilment of the basic functions of the 
State, and therefore, the word critical is associated with them 
[13-17]. Engineering systems, from the simplest to the most 
complex, meet the daily needs and demands of citizens, and 
therefore, require targeted anthropogenic care. 
Complex SCPSs belong to the different sectors manage-
ment, and therefore, they greatly differ  by the design and na-
ture. Therefore, the criteria and measures for managing and 
settling their risks are sector-dependent, even if they have the 
same objective, namely safety.  For reasons of great diversity, 
the procedures for building their safety are site and sector-
specific. Aspects important for designing the SCPSs parts and 
whole SCPSs are very diverse, especially those of: knowledge 
and technical matters, which predetermine the capacity possi-
bilities of SCPSs; organizational and legal matters enabling 
the SCPS operation at a certain level of safety in the territory 
and over time; financial matters; personnel; social; and politi-
cal at national and international level.  
Based on the present findings [13,14], each engineering 
system is characterized by the structure, hardware, procedures, 
environment, information flows, organization, and interfaces 
among these components. The basic element of safe designing 
the SCPSs in the field of technical solutions is the application 
of safe elements (i.e. reliable, functional and non-threatening 
themselves and their surroundings) elements, their qualified 
interconnections and operating modes allowing safe (i.e. relia-
ble and trouble-free) operation, and proper maintenance, back-
up of priority parts of elements, components or systems, use of 
various back-up principles and thoughtful deployment of 
back-ups. Due to SCPS complexity, it is not enough to re-
spects valid norms and standards, but it is necessary to apply 
the risk engineering  principles. The paper shows the proce-
dure of generation of risk-based design that was tested and has 
been already  used in several cases.  
II. SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE ON SCPSS DESIGNING 
Each territory has its own sources of risk [18], and there-
fore, both, the external and the internal sources of risks need to 
be addressed in relation to the design of the SCPS. Current 
knowledge shows that risks, which were not settled, cause for 
SCPS sooner or later losses, damage and harms in both, the 
public assets and on the SCPS assets [19].  
SCPSs have form of objects or networks, and they repre-
sent complex systems, the form of which is  a system of sys-
tems – SoS [1-12,14,20]. They include physical, cyber, organ-
izational and social systems, i.e., individual devices, machines, 
components, systems, or entire production or service units. 
Knowledge and experience show that SCPSs are put in a cer-
tain environment, which in any case react to located SCPS. 
From safety reasons, these reactions need to be revealed in 
advance and considered in design to ensure human security.  
The SCPS designing is covered by a wide range of prob-
lems, e.g.:  
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 theoretical analysis of critical processes, equipment 
and places 
 proposal of practical implementation of technically 
and financially available countermeasures, 
 selection of: materials; technical principles; construc-
tion procedures; determination of critical construction 
and mounting processes etc.,  
 experimental verification of installed fittings and their 
operability under normal, abnormal and critical condi-
tions, 
 ensuring: durability, tractability of equipment and pro-
cesses, required service life; quality and sufficient 
human resources, costs in the required amount, tech-
nical services; services etc.; and realization of build-
ings, structures and equipment under given conditions, 
etc. [12].  
For human security, it is needed, so that environment reac-
tions throughout SCPS lifetime would be adequate and its  
coexistence with surrounding may exist. The ensuring these 
aims  needs to be inserted in the SCPS designing. Firstly, it is 
necessary to consider sources of all risks – All-Hazard-
Approach [21]. To this set they also belong destructive phe-
nomena that are results of all mutual reactions inside and out-
side SCPS under, normal, abnormal and critical conditions 
[12].  
The identification of internal SCPS sources of risks associ-
ated on the one hand with individual technical equipment, 
their arrangement into components and systems, and on the 
other hand with production processes and their management, 
is a site specific activity which requires the risk identification 
at several levels, namely: technical equipment; components; 
systems; technical, organizational and cyber interconnections 
under normal operating conditions; technical, organizational 
and cyber interconnections under abnormal operating condi-
tions; technical, organizational and cyber interconnections 
under critical operating conditions; and for high-important 
SCPS such as nuclear power plants, dams, etc., technical, or-
ganizational and cyber-operation interconnections under ex-
treme operating conditions [13,14,22]. 
When identifying the SCPS risk sources, it is very im-
portant to consider all stable and mobile sources inside and 
outside the SCPS: fires (flash, pool, jet, fireball), explosions 
(mechanical, electrical, chemical, explosion of a cloud of gas-
es – BLEVE or VCE, dust and, or nuclear), leakage of hazard-
ous substances, because the damage will cause both, their im-
pacts and their possible domino effects [6].  
Each dangerous phenomenon can have different sizes and 
different occurrence probabilities,  and therefore, it is im-
portant the hazard determination for each one. Because ex-
treme dangerous phenomena occur rarely and irregularly, the 
hazard determination is one of  principal steps at risk determi-
nation [20]. The hazard determination is technical-
methodological method of determining the maximum ex-
pected disasters sizes. Because severe events occur randomly 
and irregularly and world dynamically  develop in space and 
time (which also leads to changes in conditions that lead to 
disasters, and, of course, to changes in the very disasters´ 
characteristics),  simple statistical methods cannot be used 
(their assumptions requiring stable processes are not fully ful-
filled). Since we do not have enough knowledge of this area, 
we must consider existence of uncertainties, both random and 
knowledge-based, and to use methods based on the theory of 
extremes [23].  
According to hazards curves we determine so call the de-
sign based disaster, which is dangerous phenomenon size, the 
occurrence probability of which is once during the time inter-
val determined by legislation [20]. The parameters of design 
based disasters are used at technical facility project, construc-
tion, outfit by fittings, equipment components, systems and 
system of systems design. They create the SCPS terms of ref-
erences. Their respecting ensures that SCPS has incorporate 
measures to prevent, mitigate and respond to unacceptable 
situations caused by internal, external and organizational 
sources of accidents and failures of elements, components and 
systems, namely for disasters´ sizes lower than design disas-
ters. They are key part of SCPS design documentation con-
taining the technical, financial, time and other data determin-
ing the safe, reliable and functional SCPS. They create so 
called limits and conditions for safe SCPS operation [12].  
According to data in [6,20], it is necessary to have in terms 
of references creation: knowledge of: regulations; risks in the 
site to which the SCPS is placed; technical system, which con-
stitutes a SCPS; models and theories associated with acci-
dents; methods of analysis, management and settlement of 
risks; and management of enterprise (finance, human re-
sources, organization, technology, innovation...); competen-
cies for: the application of results of methods of risk analysis 
and evaluation; implementation of methodology of analyzing 
and assessing the risks adapted to the problem; emergency and 
crisis management; analysis of situations / activities / acci-
dents; transformation of policy into real actions; the conver-
sion of accident statistics into action plans; strategic planning;  
hierarchy of problems; capability to find right information and 
lesson learned; critical analysis; designing the right solutions; 
communication; carrying out the synthesis and adapting the 
wording intended for the public; and ethics. 
In terms of references  creation, in the light of possible 
disasters in site and in connection with  coexistence of SCPS 
with surroundings, it is necessary to specify: for each relevant 
disaster, size of threat according to given standards; identify 
critical tasks of SCPS from integral safety viewpoint; under-
stand tasks and causes of their criticality; identified possible 
human failures; and propose measures for safety ensuring with 
regard to variable conditions. 
Critical SCPS tasks from integral safety viewpoint are 
physical activities, by which operator contributes to: triggering 
the non-committed and unacceptable phenomenon;  detection 
and prevention of phenomenon in question; management and 
mitigation of phenomenon in question; and response to emer-
gency situation. At terms of references creating, it is necessary 
to consider that to criticality they also contribute: lack of 
communication (errors and interruptions in the flow of infor-
mation);  routine approach (certainty resulting from long-term 
practice in combination with risk awareness loss caused by 
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frequent repetitive activities and tired work); lack of 
knowledge (ambiguity or misunderstanding); distraction (con-
fusion, mental chaos); lack of team collaboration (inconsistent 
efforts of a group of people due to a lack of belonging, fear of 
other mistakes, inappropriate leadership style or inappropriate 
communication);  fatigue (it is ignored because people per-
ceive it after it is excessive); lack of means (lack of resources, 
tools and materials, outdated documentation, inappropriate 
working conditions);  coercion (from superiors or colleagues, 
lack of time, incorrect task settings);  lack of self-esteem (ina-
bility to refuse to perform tasks resulting from lack of self-
esteem, anxiety or complexes);  stress (nervousness caused 
e.g.: time pressure, new methodology, change in the range of 
tasks, competitions or private factors); negligence (incorrect 
assessment of the possible consequences of action caused by 
e.g.: coercion, lack of experience or lack of knowledge); ac-
ceptability of a large number of deviations from instructions 
and standards in order to facilitate work. 
The aim of SCPS design is to create a production process 
that is profitable, economic, safe and does not threaten public 
assets, especially humans and environment. This can be 
achieved by optimizing the safeguard, economic and function-
al criteria. SCPS design covers a wide range of problems, for 
example, it goes on selection of: materials; technical princi-
ples; construction procedures; framework procedures; deter-
mination of critical construction and framework processes;  
protection ways in domains physical, cyber etc. It, therefore, 
requires the participation of many different knowledge fields, 
i.e. the participation of a number of specialists from different 
fields. It should be remembered that here the human factor 
manifests. The low cooperation of experts leads to errors that 
will occur later at operation, e.g. they lead to: occurrence of 
organizational accidents [24]; maintenance problems [13,14]; 
impossibility to repair important parts [25] etc.  
In each SCPS design from safety perspective, it is neces-
sary to follow the requirements for: durability; manageability 
of equipment and processes; lifespan; human resources; costs; 
technical services; service; safety of employees, humans in 
surroundings and environment. Consideration and good provi-
sion of requirements in question determines the future costs of 
ensuring the safety and coexistence of technical facility with 
surroundings. E.g., non-provision of  human resources for 
operation leads to limitation of production or service that is 
provided by the SCPS [12]. 
Designing the SCPS is a very complex activity, and in 
each country is regulated by national legislation (e.g. in the 
Czech Republic - the Act No. 183/2006 Coll.) and in some 
cases (e.g. nuclear installations) by international ones [26,27]. 
Research results [12] show: from safety viewpoint, the main 
goal is to avert unwanted combinations of incidents that have 
potential to cause accidents accompanied by major damages. 
To do this, proactive indicators or safety functions are used to 
control safety under border conditions, thereby the occurrence 
possibility of unlikely severe accident is reducing.  
Seven principles of resilience are used: backup; to insert 
ability of sleek and controlled degradation; to insert ability to 
return from degraded state; flexibility in both, the system and 
the organization; to insert ability to control limit conditions 
close to the performance interface; to insert optimal manage-
ment models; to reduce complexity; and to reduce possible 
undesirable couplings. In design, it  is necessary to include 
program for safety increase that ensures: safety and function-
ality of all fittings that corresponds to their missions;  identifi-
cation, evaluation, elimination or regulation of potential risks 
at acceptable level for important installations, systems and 
their various parts; risk management, which includes all possi-
ble disasters with resources inside and outside the SCPS that 
cannot be eliminated; protection of personnel, people in the 
vicinity, facilities and property; use of new materials or prod-
ucts and test techniques only in a way that is associated only 
with minimal risk; insertion of safety factors that ensure cor-
rective measures that lead to improvement;  consideration of 
all appropriate historical data on ensuring the safety generated 
by similar safety-enhancing programs. 
From engineering viewpoint, conditions and limits of op-
eration are established, safety systems (active, passive and 
hybrid) are installed and appropriate backups are ensured; it is 
solved: what safety systems are appropriate and what must be 
their backup; where / in which places safety systems operate 
most effectively; why they must be used just there and not 
elsewhere, in what limits they work reliably. 
It is a fact that, at SCPS designing there are often used 
software based on tree models.  Based on the current 
knowledge summarized in [20], it should be remembered that 
tree models do not create a basis for mastering all possible 
disasters that affect the whole SCPS, because they  start on 
one point in the technical facility, for example, they do not 
consider impacts of external disasters, attacks and human fac-
tor. 
According to  [10,11,30-33], for the SCPS safety during 
the lifetime, it is necessary  at designing to consider at each 
critical process the problems connected with: given process; 
designing a process; process management; operational staff 
and signaling its condition; safety management system; other 
technical systems promoting the safety; external active and 
passive systems for mitigating the risks leaded to process fail-
ure; SCPS emergency response; and SCPS surrounding re-
sponse.  
According to knowledge summarized in [14], it is im-
portant so that the processes risk management strategy may 
use: principles of inherent safety, e.g. [30,31]; and  passive 
safety systems, active safety systems and different barriers 
types, procedural procedures that are proven or thoroughly 
tested in such a way that they do not contain latent sources of 
danger under possible conditions  [12].  
To ensure the important SCPS safety, the Defense-In-
Depth principle is used  [32]. The principle in question is im-
plemented using a combination of several subsequent dearly 
independent levels of protection. The basic condition is - when 
one level of protection or barrier fails, the subsequent level 
must be available. When approach is well applied, so individ-
ual technical, human or organizational failure should not lead 
to devastating impacts, and a combination of several failures 
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leading to devastating impacts should have a low occurrence 
probability. Special attention must be paid to pressure equip-
ment with dangerous substances [12,25].  
From a professional viewpoint, safety document shall con-
tain answers to questions: what may break down; what may 
not work (hazard identification and its analysis); how serious 
consequences (risk assessment) can be; what measures need to 
be taken to avoid this (risk management);  what needs to be 
done when this occurs (emergency measures). 
III. DATA AND METHODS USED IN RESEARCH 
For research, the original database of SCPS accidents and 
failures from world data was compiled [25] and several case 
studies were analyzed in great details in [12]. The database 
contains 7829 events from the whole world sources that were 
accessible in last 35 years to authors; 521 events originated 
due to mistakes in designing.  
To reveal the event roots (risk causes), the collected  data 
were processed by risk engineering methods: e.g. What, If; 
Checklist; Fishbone diagram; Case studies; Event Tree; 
FMECA; etc. [33]. Their results were critically assessed and 
separated into classes according similarity of causes  and cre-
ate the basis for Decision Support System enabling to mul-
ticriterial assessment of possible SCPS risks [12]. The results 
obtained from  lessons learned from the risk impacts suppres-
sions were also critically assessed and separated into classes 
according similarity of response tools and created the basis for 
Risk Management Plan that is based on the TQM management 
method [34] and it is recommended by ISO 31000 [35]. 
IV. RISK CAUSES IN DESIGN 
The causes of  SCPS failures and accidents in database 
[25] were split up into categories: deficits in SCPS design-
ing; deficits in performance of supervision by public ad-
ministration; legislation deficit;  and other. These catego-
ries were further subdivided; e.g.: the first one was desig-
nated into: errors in terms of references (e.g. omitting the 
critical disaster); errors in design (e.g. mistakes in concept 
of barriers; omitting of important norms and standards 
etc.); or legislation deficits into: low authority of public 
administration  supervision; very general requirements on 
design, construction, outfit by technology equipment, test-
ing and commissioning, etc.  
The specific identified causes of SCPS failures and acci-
dents found in a designing are omissions, errors and deficien-
cies in:  
1. SCPS design - factual area:  
 errors in terms of references (e.g. not used the All 
Hazard Approach procedure; incorrectly determined 
hazard sizes of disasters; not applied Defense-In-
Depth principle etc. – further ones in [12], 
 errors in the project (an inappropriate building model 
used for calculations with regard to the conditions in 
the site, either too theoretical or general or not to settle 
uncertainty and uncertainty; not properly used princi-
ple Defense-In-Depth principle), 
 omitting the site vulnerabilities  as e.g. large popula-
tions, existence of objects such as hospitals, schools, 
etc., 
 insufficient capacity sources of energy, water and 
sewerage, 
 insufficient capacity of transport routes, lack of staff 
to operate, etc., 
 the non-determination of critical building sites, which 
led to omission of measures for risk management to-
wards safety at normal operation – as barriers, on the 
basis of an assessment of the risks to their safety, i.e. 
barriers, backups – further ones in [12], 
 the non-determination of critical building sites, which 
lead  to omission of measures for risk management 
towards safety at abnormal operation  conditions, – on 
the basis of an assessment of the risks to their safety, 
i.e. the risk assessment of their safety, i.e. barriers, 
backups – further ones in [12], 
 the non-determination of critical points of technology 
and production processes, which led to omission of 
measures for risks management to safety, protection 
and dependability under abnormal and critical condi-
tions - barriers, advances, principles to increase safety, 
 they have not been considered and adequately ad-
dressed critical points of technology (pressure vessels 
and their  equipment in which dangerous substances 
are or carry out hazardous reactions or pressured 
pipes, mainly those with hazardous substances) and 
places in which there is a risk of operator failure from 
the point of view of potential risks, 
 failure to comply with good practice standards or the 
application of erroneous standards (which has led to 
the project being designed: inappropriate materials; 
inappropriate technical principles; inappropriate con-
struction procedures; inappropriate design procedures; 
critical construction and construction processes have 
not been established and specific measures have been 
proposed for their quality design; equipment, ma-
chines, components and systems did not meet the safe-
ty, reliability and long-term functionality require-
ments, i.e. the safety, reliability and long-term func-
tionality of the equipment, machinery, components 
and systems; durability and easy handling of equip-
ment and processes; ergonomic requirements of the 
operator, service requirements, maintenance and fi-
nancial costs associated with them are not respected; 
inappropriate placement of protective equipment and 
safety support systems; inappropriate technologies of 
construction, construction and assembly), 
 in creation of design of automatic and semi-automatic 
control systems, there were deficiencies caused by in-
sufficient knowledge or lack of cooperation of special-
ists from different disciplines or the use of faulty or 
imperfect IT tools, 
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 non-incorporation of technical measures for the basic 
physical and cyber protection of technical facility, 
 not considering the possibilities of changes in: laws 
during construction; system of taxation during the 
construction; interest system during construction; 
market situation – inflation, deflation, demand chang-
es, etc.; support for technical facility by the State (e.g. 
when changing political representation); supplies of 
essential materials and technologies and relied on only 
one supplier, leading to problems in construction and 
operation – e.g. due to the lack of finance or unavaila-
bility of the material, some buildings and equipment 
were then ripped off. 
2. Supervision of public administration over SCPS design:  
 lack of public administration supervision, e.g. it did not 
ask for documentation on certification of SCPS safety 
in all important six stages of the SCPS referred to 
above, 
 neglecting the solution of sufficient capacity of local 
sources of energy, water and sewerage, transport routes 
and personnel in SCPS  facility sitting and design, 
 neglecting the assessment of investor financial capacity 
in granting the relevant authorizations.  
3. Inadequate legislation:  
 insufficient public administration supervisory power, 
 insufficient legislation governing the design of SCPS 
(too general, incomplete, allows for several interpreta-
tions, 
 insufficient enforceability of the right to safety, em-
ployee protection, public protection and the environ-
ment. 
4. Other:  
 the State has not professional institution which has 
been able to professionally assess the process of mak-
ing the SCPS in all aspects, 
 haste in design and construction due to pressure from 
politicians, 
 the State has not developed a system of supervision 
under design of SCPS, 
 the State did not have criteria for assessing the accura-
cy of the design of SCPS, 
 contractor and investor did not cooperate with the pub-
lic administration during the design of the SCPS, 
 natural disaster occurrence as:  earthquake;  landslide; 
flood; fire, 
 occurrence of phenomena as: corruption; insider´ at-
tack; hackers´ attack; terrorist attack.  
V. RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
The risk management plan for design process is after pre-
vention principles the second important tool for the SCPS de-
sign. For creating this top-quality safety management tool, 
they are considered both, the current knowledge and experi-
ence on risks associated with SCPS and their surroundings 
summarized in [12], and the new real knowledge, which were 
obtained from study of compiled original database of SCPS 
failures and accidents, among the causes of which they were 
found defects  in the area of design; totally 521 cases were 
identified.  
The aim of risk management plan is to ensure the SCPS 
coexistence with surroundings. Two actors are considered - 
public administration, which supervises activities in the terri-
tory including the SCPS with aim to ensure the safety of terri-
tory and citizens, and designer, who is responsible for the 
safety of design of SCPS, which also includes the protection 
of the surroundings and inhabitants.  It is prepared in  the form 
of table; Table 1 shows example for designing; complete table 
is are in [12].  
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Risk description  Probability of 
occurrence 
Risk impacts size 











As a result of absence of a State strategy on 
SCPS design focused on safety, it is possible to 
enforce  current political interests, requirements 
of coercive groups or the failure to cope with 
extreme political situations (war, terrorist at-
tacks), which in turn leads to reduction in hu-
man living standard and safety of citizens, eco-
nomic instability, etc.  
Probability: Large  
Impacts: Large  
 
Measures: To develop the relevant State 
strategy and adapt the Building Act  
Execute: Prime minister 
Responsibility: Parliament chairman  
Due to lack of competence of public authority in 
overseeing the SCPS design there is an exten-
sion of construction, problems in commission-
ing, accidents accompanied by enormous ex-
penditure from the public budget, disruption of 
citizens security.  
Probability: Large  
Impacts: Large 
Measures: To adapt the Competence Act and 
the laws associated with it. 
Execute: Prime Minister  
Responsibility: Parliament chairman  
As a result of errors in the authorized designer 
selection, the project is of poor quality, which 
sooner or later will disrupt the construction or 
operation and lead to accidents accompanied by 
enormous expenditure, disruption of  citizens 
safety and problems with public administration. 
Probability: Me-
dium  
Impacts: Large  
 
Measures: Change of designer  
Execute: Authorized investor worker  








As a result of a poor estimate in the field of 
supplier – customer relations, the project is 
based on unrealistic data, which sooner or later  
will lead to disrupts the construction or opera-
tion of a SCPS, enormous expenditure, disrup-




Impacts: Large  
 
Measures:  To force investor to perform rem-
edy  
Execute: Authorized future operator worker  











As a result of a poor quality or non-cooperative 
team of project processors, the project is of poor 
quality and it leads sooner or later to disruption 
of construction or operation, enormous expendi-




Impacts: Large  
 
Measures: To introduce rules for team coop-
eration 
Execute: Authorized designer team worker 
Responsibility: Authorized designer team 
director  
 
Table 1 serves for protection against problems that impede 
to building permit issue. Table shows that big role plays the 
human factor, namely at way of execution of critical tasks of 
designing (terms of references compilation, use of knowledge 
on compilation of safe design etc.) and at professionality of 
supervision performed by the public administration directed to 
public interest.  
Risk management plan was tested with success at six me-
dium SCPS [25]; their site-specific compilation and applica-
tion in practice are ambitious on experts´ knowledge and time, 
and it requires the access to detail SCPS and public admin-
istration documents, which is connected with respecting the 
certain legal rules.  
VI. PROCEDURE OF SCPS RISK-BASED DESIGN GENERATION 
Based on the above facts, we have compiled a procedure 
for SCPS risk-based design compilation to respect applicable 
standards, practices of good practice and the above principles 
for working with risks. Since in many cases it is necessary 
also to consider the opposite criteria when deciding on a prob-
lem, we used both simple methods (linear and tree) and multi-
criteria tool – the DSS in the work [36] when working with 
risks, for each component, the process of production and the 
entire facility, i.e. socio-cyber-physical system. 
When deciding on specific items, we used both partial 
risks of critical components and systems and their intercon-
nection, as well as integrated process risks and integral risk of 
the whole. We considered all the risk sources listed in chapter 
above, determined their sizes for the above items that had the 
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parameters required by the standards. For all relevant risk 
sources (in accordance with focus, we have considered the 
eight most common combinations of external risk sources) we 
have identified the threat size for the 1000-year interval for 
quiet sites (the size of risk sources of all kinds is acceptable 
and calculated in all construction and design standards), places 
at risk (with one to two larger sources of risk not foreseen in 
building and design standards) and critical sites (multiple 
sources of major risks , which is not foreseen in building and 
construction standards). 
In the case of the second and third cases, the designer 
needs to think as follows: 
1. Can I eliminate the hazard?  
2. Can I reduce the size of this hazard?  
3. Cannot I create a new hazard  with the proposed measures 
to manage this hazard?  
4. What technical and control systems are required to manage 
the hazard that is left? 
In order to manage the SCPS safety according to [12,19] 
within the design it is necessary to create:  
 conditions for shaping the culture of safety in the operation 
of the SCPS, which is implemented by: compliance with 
safety rules and procedures; the responsibilities of the 
managers; workplace running reporting systems; work-
place audits; communication with employees; a proactive 
approach to risk management; taking care of a safe work-
place, communications on safety, and training the employ-
ees., 
 the right loss prevention policy implemented by safety 
management (higher priority than reliability), 
 a clear division of responsibilities (consistency between 
competences and responsibilities is important), 
 the distribution of equipment, components and systems 
according to criticality,  
 operating regulations for normal, abnormal and critical 
conditions,  
 correct modes for the operation of equipment, components 
and systems, especially critical ones, 
 summary of critical assets - their limits and conditions and 
requirements for risk based inspections (RBI), 
 maintenance plan (preventive and forecasting for critical 
equipment, components and systems),  
 modernization and renewal of equipment, components and 
systems, especially critical ones,  
 a program of non-destructive tests of critical equipment,  
 emergency (contingency) plans, 
  a continuity plan that ensures the survival of the SCPS 
(mainly its critical items) under extreme conditions.  
On the basis of above knowledge and experiences from 
practice [25,37], the technique for compilation of  a risk-based 
design we propose by such way:  
1. To establish a list of components and systems that comply 
with the standards and will be combined into sub-units.  
2. For all items in the list of components and systems (point 
1), to determine the limits and conditions from the point of 
view of their operation in a particular territory with regard 
to: the material from which they are made; demands on up-
time; the working mode in which they will work; human 
factor; and possible other risks (internal fire or explosion 
and external risks).  
3. For all items in the list of components and systems (point 
1), to determine for the site-specific sources of risks de-
termined by considering the All-Hazard-Approach, the siz-
es and characteristics of the partial risks. 
4. For all risk sources (point 3) to determine impact scenari-
os; and when some risk impacts are not acceptable, it is 
necessary to increase the material and construction re-
quirements so that these risks may be acceptable. 
5. To establish the component interconnections and model of 
their interconnections, which meets standards and inherent 
safety requirements.  
6. For all interconnections (point 5) to  determine the limits 
and conditions from the point of view of their material 
composition, method of execution (loose, tight, or com-
plex), methods of interconnection (welds, screws, rivets, 
seals, etc.) and the realization of possible other risks (in-
ternal fire or explosion, human factor and external risks).  
7. For the risk sources (point 3) to determine impacts scenar-
ios of partial risks for all interconnections and integrated 
risk for whole made up from jointed components; when the 
partial risks and integrated risk of whole made up from 
jointed components  are not acceptable, it is necessary to 
increase requirements on  material and construction of 
components interconnections so that these risks may be 
acceptable.  
8. For the risk sources (point 3) to determine for the entire 
production process the process impact scenarios showing 
the integrated risk manifestation. In the case that the inte-
grated risk  is not acceptable, to increase the demands on 
design of: components of production process; working re-
gime; and  operators, so that the risks may be acceptable. 
9. For the risk sources (point 3) to determine integral risk. If 
the risk is only conditionally acceptable (ALARP), then 
make modifications to the technology that will allow an 
immediate quality response that will ensure a return to 
normal state. In case of unacceptable risk, it is necessary to 
return to the adjustment of partial risks of components, 
systems and their interconnection (planned and even those 
that arise in the realization of sources of major risks) and 
the introduction of the principle of fail safely.  
10. Considering the risk sources (point 3) to specify require-
ments for the steering system,  that is for both, the  I&C 
and the operators under normal, abnormal and critical con-
ditions.  
The above procedure of generation of SCPS risk-based design 
was tested with success at seven medium SCPS [25,37]. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The quality of SCPS design predetermines its safety 
throughout the operation. Examples from practice show that 
some errors, such as  underestimation of foundation conditions 
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or some errors in terms of references, cannot be removed after 
the construction completion and commissioning. They pose a 
danger under certain conditions (e.g. at flood or earthquake) 
and can only be mitigated by organizational measures that 
entail additional costs and do not have the ability to ensure 
safety level as correct measures at design stage [13,14,25].  
The above-summarized knowledge and results of study of  
SCPS accidents and failures show that basis for ensuring the 
facilities safety at required life cycle is knowledge of: regula-
tions (legislation, norms, standards) in context; risks in the site 
to which the technical facility is placed; technical system, 
which constitutes a technical facility; models and theories as-
sociated with accidents; methods of analysis, management and 
settlement of risks; and way of management that operator 
might use after commissioning (finance, human resources, 
organization, technology, innovation...).  
Furthermore, it is necessary for all those involved to re-
spect the public interest, to participate in building the safety 
culture and for managers to motivate employees to do quality 
work, even by their own example, as shown by the so-called 
"golden rules of safety” [29]. The grounds need to be inserted 
into the design. 
An analysis of environmental development as well as de-
velopment of political, social and economic situation in the 
world shows the need to be prepared for the resolution of cas-
es and actions that will cause critical situations with impacts  
intensities higher than these today.  In order to manage realiza-
tion of risks which are inherent in  present world using the 
adequate forces, resources and means, it should be had: prin-
ciples for managing the emergencies and critical situations, 
especially those of a large range; allocation of resources; and 
allocation of responsibilities. The risk management plan is tool 
that gives overview on measures, the person who execute 
them and the responsible person for execution.  
Since the design of a SCPS is complex, the Process Safety 
Management (PSM) should be required for rational manage-
ment of each process and for complete management is re-
quired the Safety Management System (SMS) [13,16,29] for 
rational management of each process. For practice, twelve 
methodologies for public administration are presented at work 
[33].Most of these methodologies can also be used for SCPS 
in the event of external risk sources. For internal sources of 
risk, specific investigations should always be carried out or 
procedures should always be applied to analogue SCPS where 
the conditions for technology transfer are met [38].  
The results of the study [12,36,37]  show that designer´ 
competences are very important for: the application of the 
results of methods of risk analysis and evaluation; implemen-
tation of the methodology for analyzing and assessing the risks 
adapted to the problem; emergency and crisis management; 
analysis of situations / activities / accidents; the transformation 
of policy into a real action; the conversion of accident statis-
tics into action plans; strategic planning; hierarchy of prob-
lems; finding the right information and learning; critical anal-
ysis; designing the right solutions; communication; carrying 
out synthesis and adapting the wording intended for the pub-
lic; and ethics. 
At each decision in favor of safety it should be remem-
bered: all factors and processes that can be dangerous and how 
often they can occur; how large their impacts can be; how the 
size of the impacts or frequency of occurrence can be reduced; 
whether the proposed measures cannot be a source of new 
hazards; and which technical and control systems can be con-
trolled by hazards that cannot be prevented.  
Finally, it should be noted that, in line with the results at 
work [14], it is essential what is the political will to create a 
system to protect against unacceptable impacts of harmful 
phenomena, i.e. natural and other disasters. An analysis of 
environmental development as well as the development of the 
political, social and economic situation in the world shows the 
need to prepare for the resolution of cases and actions that will 
cause critical situations by the intensity of impacts, and these 
are phenomena that do not today have such cruelty ( severity) 
in the followed territory. Therefore, in terms of human securi-
ty, the development of the human system, the existence, stabil-
ity and development of the State, the concept of human safety 
and the subsequent concept of development must be codified 
and implemented through the management of safety into prac-
tice. In order to manage the realization of the risks, which are  
inherent in the present world using adequate forces, resources 
and means, it should be had: management principles for man-
aging emergencies and critical situations, especially those of a 
large range; allocation of resources; and allocation of respon-
sibilities. 
The research showed that: 
 each technical facility design has a certain danger. The 
designer art is to select such solution that is optimal, i.e. it 
is sufficiently safe and it is possible to realize with regard 
to investor and public administration options. The near the 
same holds for manufacturer´ skill  (craftsmanship) at real-
ization, 
 impressive and low robust designs with insufficient safety 
margins often fail sooner or later, 
 wrongly determined limits and conditions for critical tech-
nical facility parts lead to frequent disturbances up to seri-
ous accidents; they are not able to react to condition 
changes. 
The analysis of accessible legislations [25] revealed that 
rules in force do not require to follow operation process safety 
in designing, and this occasionally leads to problems at opera-
tion, which is revealed e.g. in [19]. Based on authors´ experi-
ences from practice [25,37], they compiled procedure for gen-
eration of SCPS risk-based design. There is continued the pro-
cedure implementation in practice and its improvement.  
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